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Privacy as an integral part of the implementation of cloud solutions 
 
Abstract 
 
Bridging the gap between design and implementation stages has been a major concern of design-
ers, analysts and developers of information systems and a major aspiration of a number of Infor-
mation System (IS) engineering approaches. Cloud computing exacerbates the strain on tradition-
al IS engineering approaches that service-oriented computing has started. At the same time, re-
cent research has argued about the importance of security and privacy in a cloud environment and 
highlighted a number of security and privacy challenges that are not present in traditional envi-
ronments and need special attention when implementing or migrating information systems into a 
cloud environment. This paper contributes to this direction. Specifically, it presents a number of 
privacy-related cloud properties that analysts need to consider when designing privacy-aware 
systems in a cloud environment. Also it indicates a number of implementation techniques that 
can assist developers in assuring the respective properties. 
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Privacy as an integral part of the implementation of cloud solutions 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years Cloud Computing has become an attractive IT paradigm to a broad range of 
users, from small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and public administrations to end-users. 
The great demand for cloud services from online users, along with the reduced operational costs 
that these offer, have motivated many organizations to consider implementing new services or 
migrating existing applications on the cloud. However, despite the positive characteristics of 
cloud service models such as reduced costs, enhanced availability, on demand data storage and 
computing power, there are major concerns related to information privacy mainly due to the dis-
tributed character of cloud architectures, the involvement of different stakeholders in the opera-
tion of cloud services, and the limited (lack of) users’ control of their data.  
The Cloud computing paradigm is based on three delivery models: Infrastructure as a Service 
(SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Software as a Service (SaaS). Each providing, virtual-
ized and on demand resources (computing power, network and storage), application development 
platforms and software services, respectively.  Each delivery model is considered as a separate 
layer that is depended from the others with IaaS being the foundation, PaaS building upon IaaS 
and SaaS building upon PaaS. As a result, any attack to any cloud service layer can compromise 
the upper layers [1]. The service model also dictates end users’ scope and control over the com-
putational environment. In general, the higher the level of support available from a cloud provid-
er, the narrower the scope and control the cloud user has over the system. IaaS is the model that 
enables more direct control but also leaves the cloud service user responsible for the implementa-
tion of privacy measures. Still the IaaS provider will typically take responsibility for securing the 
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data centres, network and systems, and will take steps to ensure that its employees and operation-
al procedures comply with applicable laws and regulations [2]. Thus, the cloud provider has an 
important role on managing and implementing security and privacy measures in all three levels of 
abstraction. 
Privacy is also affected by the selected cloud deployment model. The deployment model de-
notes the management and disposition of computational resources, as well as the differentiation 
between classes of users. In a private or community cloud for example, the computational re-
sources are exclusive to a single organization or to a number of ‘trusted’ organizations that have 
common privacy considerations, thus reducing perceived privacy risks. In a public or hybrid 
cloud resources are shared between multiple users. However, in all cases the same threats related 
to the nature of cloud computing apply and therefore, privacy protection measures still need be 
considered.  
The scope of the paper is twofold. First, it contributes to the existing literature through the 
identification of cloud specific privacy properties. Privacy properties are quality characteristics 
that the cloud service must demonstrate and which affect users’ privacy (in terms of controlling 
how personal data is gathered, stored, processed or disseminated). Second, it advances the state 
of the art in privacy engineering for cloud computing, by introducing a number of implementa-
tion techniques that assure privacy properties in a cloud environment. These represent standard 
privacy enhancing mechanisms, which are able to prevent or detect privacy breaches. Although 
further analysis is necessary to specify the sub-mechanism(s) that can realize each implementa-
tion technique in the context of a specific cloud solution, we claim that identifying, early at the 
design stage, the possible means that contribute to the satisfaction of users privacy needs, can 
lead to implementations where privacy is an integral part.  
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents related work in the ar-
ea of privacy requirements engineering, within traditional software engineering methods as well 
as cloud computing. Section 3 discusses the privacy properties attributed to the cloud taking into 
consideration the relative security concerns and cloud service model. Section 4 describes a num-
ber of implementation techniques that realize the aforementioned properties. From a methodolog-
ical perspective, section 5 illustrates a privacy driven way-of-working for defining appropriate 
implementation solutions using an eHealth example. Section 6 discusses the relation between 
privacy and trust issues in the cloud and how privacy-oriented and trust-oriented approaches can 
work together to bring new solutions to protecting user data. Finally, section 7 concludes the pa-
per. 
 
2. Related Work 
A number of researchers have focused on requirements engineering methods that support the 
elicitation and modeling of privacy issues during the early stages of software systems develop-
ment. The majority considers privacy as a security constraint. For example, Secure Tropos an 
extension of Tropos methodology proposed in [3] employs the concepts of security constraint, 
and secure dependency in order to model and analyze security issues during the requirements 
engineering phase.  Similarly, the SecReq approach introduced in [4] describes a systematic ap-
proach to derive security requirements from system security objectives. In [5] misuse cases are 
used in order to represent security threats and to identify ‘‘security use cases’’, i.e., countermeas-
ures that mitigate the threats.  
PriS on the other hand, is a requirements engineering method that focuses specifically on pri-
vacy [6 – 8]. It makes the distinction between eight technical privacy requirements (such as ano-
nymity and unlinkability) and adopts the use of process patterns as a way to: (a) describe the ef-
 6 
fect of privacy requirements on business processes; and (b) facilitate the identification of the sys-
tem architecture that best supports the privacy-related business processes. 
Work on privacy patterns focuses on reoccurring privacy-related problems and how these can 
best be solved with proven solutions. For example the privacy patterns for web-based activity, 
described in [9] document how to convey privacy policies to end users during online interactions. 
In [10] a pattern language is proposed, containing 12 patterns for developing anonymity solutions 
for various domains including anonymous messaging, anonymous voting and location anonymi-
ty.  
Another line of work relates to legal compliance. Islam et al. [11] use natural language pat-
terns and make use of the Hohfeld legal taxonomy, to extract security requirements from laws 
and combine them with the ISO/IEC policies. Finally they trace the identified requirements into 
secure system design. [12] describes an approach for evaluating the legal compliance of existing 
security and privacy requirements, by establishing traceability links from requirements to legal 
texts.   
Recent research works deal with security and privacy issues related to the cloud-computing 
domain. Some identify existing cloud technology vulnerabilities where faults can occur. For ex-
ample, [13] demonstrates that attackers can exploit data duplication techniques to access custom-
er data by obtaining hash code of the stored file. Side-channel attack can instantiate new VMs of 
a target virtual machine so that the new VM can potentially monitor the cache hosted on the same 
physical machine as described in [14]. Other works focus on security and privacy attacks that 
may lead to a misuse of information or resources. For instance, [15] argues that privacy threats 
differ depending on the type of cloud scenario and lack of user control, potential unauthorized 
secondary usage and data proliferation. [1] summarizes the vulnerabilities and threats reported in 
the literature and it presents some countermeasures that solve or improve the identified problems. 
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In addition, [16] suggest tools for supporting the analysis of security and privacy risks from 
different perspectives in order to make informed decisions during the migration of IT systems to 
the cloud.  
From the above discussion, it is clear that security and privacy modeling, in a cloud context, 
is attracting the attention of the research community. However, even though it is acknowledged 
that privacy threats and associated privacy concerns differ depending on the application context, 
most methods deal with privacy as a single requirement. Failing to understand the different facets 
of privacy leads to difficulty in identifying which privacy measures should be deployed. The pri-
vacy properties identified in this paper and their correspondence to specific privacy implementa-
tion techniques aim to aid designers to deal with the complex relationship between organizational 
privacy requirements and appropriate design solutions. 
 
3. Privacy-Oriented Properties 
Although privacy is common concern in distributed information systems, additional privacy 
issues arise due to the nature of cloud computing.  In order to identify those particular issues we 
take into consideration (a) the security threats and vulnerabilities related to the nature of cloud 
computing and (b) the cloud service model employed.  
The main advantages of cloud computing, its ability to scale rapidly, store data remotely and 
share services in a dynamic environment, have also created a number of vulnerabilities in terms 
of data protection. These vulnerabilities are reflected in a number of security threats reported in 
[1, 17, 18]. In [19] we have compiled a comprehensive list of 14 cloud related threats and vulner-
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abilities1 indicating the cloud service model, to which they apply. These are briefly demonstrated 
in Table 1 in terms of their privacy implications. 
Table 1. Cloud threats and vulnerabilities and associated privacy implications 
Cloud Threat Cloud Vulnerability Cloud Service Model Privacy implication 
Abuse of Cloud Services   IaaS, PaaS Abuse relative cloud ano-
nymity to hamper fraud de-
tection such as password 
cracking. 
Data Breaches  IaaS, PaaS, SaaS Unauthorized access to user 
data referred also as data 
leakage. 
Data Loss  IaaS, PaaS, SaaS Accidental or malicious de-
letion of user data. 
Account Hijacking  IaaS, PaaS, SaaS Gaining access to user cre-
dentials. 
Denial of Service  IaaS, PaaS, SaaS Preventing users to access 
their data. 
 Insecure APIs IaaS, PaaS, SaaS Implications arising from the 
set of software interfaces 
consumers use to manage 
and interact with the cloud 
service. 
 Malicious Insiders IaaS, PaaS, SaaS Misuse of sensitive user in-
formation from entities hav-
ing authorized access to it. 
 Shared Technology Issue IaaS Vulnerabilities or miscon-
figuration of the underlying 
infrastructure that compro-
mises privacy of user data.  
 Insufficient Due Dili-
gence 
IaaS, PaaS, SaaS Lack of understanding of the 
privacy issues relating to 
cloud adoption. 
 Privileged User Access IaaS, PaaS, SaaS Unlimited access to user data 
                                                
1 We adopt the ISO IEC 27000 2014 definition, whereby a threat is a potential cause of an unwanted incident, which 
may result in harm to a system or organization, whereas vulnerability is a weakness that can be exploited by one or 
more threats. 
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by authorized system admin-
istrators. 
 Regulatory Compliance IaaS, PaaS, SaaS Difficulty to ensure compli-
ance with different privacy 
legislations in multiple juris-
dictions. 
 Data Location IaaS, PaaS, SaaS Loss of control as to 
“where” user data is resided 
and in effect on the regulato-
ry framework that applies. 
 Lack of Data Segregation  PaaS, SaaS Incomplete isolation of dif-
ferent users’ data. 
 Insufficient Investigate 
Support 
IaaS, PaaS, SaaS Difficulty in examining the 
causes and the circumstances 
of a privacy violation inci-
dent 
 
As shown in Table 1, different cloud service models are not equally affected by all the above 
threats and vulnerabilities. For example, some of them are more applicable to IaaS such as shared 
technology issues, due to flaws of the virtualization technology. Lack of data segregation, relates 
to ineffective isolation of re-deployable platforms or multi-customer applications and mainly af-
fects PaaS and SaaS service models. Privileged user access applies to all service models, because 
is referred to the fact that certain employees have authorized access to the cloud’s services and as 
a result customer’s data due to the nature of their work (e.g., a system administrator). Similarly, 
abuse of cloud services mainly affects IaaS and PaaS models since it refers to the misuse of com-
puting power. As a result, the privacy concerns need to be determined on a case-by-case basis 
and in relation to the nature of the cloud services in question.  
All of the above threats and vulnerabilities represent potential circumstances that may lead to 
misuse of information or resources. However, in order to deal with these circumstances, it is im-
portant to identify the privacy-related properties that are affected by each threat or vulnerability.  
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The aim of this section is twofold. Firstly, to identify and describe the privacy related proper-
ties associated to respective cloud threats and vulnerabilities. Secondly, to indicate the corre-
spondence between privacy properties and cloud service models thus assisting stakeholders to 
decide which privacy properties need to be considered in order to satisfy their privacy needs on 
different cloud service model. The proposed set of privacy properties has been based on the Eu-
ropean Commission Draft Report on Security Issues in Cloud Computing [20] as well as on our 
previous work presented in [3, 6, 21 – 25]. For each property, we provide a brief explanation and 
describe how it might affect user privacy. It should be noted that some properties are also rele-
vant to ‘traditional’ distributed systems (e.g., accountability). In all cases however, the focus of 
the discussion bellow is on how these concepts are understood within the context of cloud com-
puting. 
 
3.1 Isolation  
Multi-tenancy and shared resources are defining characteristics of cloud computing. Isolation 
refers to all these mechanisms aiming to the complete seal of user’s data inside the cloud compu-
ting environment, and applies to the underlying multi-tenant architecture (IaaS), re-deployable 
platforms (PaaS) and multi-customer applications (SaaS).  
The probability of isolation failures in cloud computing is considered very high [26], as isola-
tion might be affected by the following threats and vulnerabilities: Abuse of Cloud Services, Ac-
count Hijacking, Data Breaches, Insecure APIs, Malicious Insiders, Shared Technology Issue, 
Privileged User Access and Lack of Data Segregation. 
The impact of isolation failure on privacy protection is also very high, since it poses the risk 
of disclosure of personal identifiable information, thus it is an important privacy-related property.  
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3.2 Provenanceability 
Cloud provenance studies the history of cloud resources activity [27].  Provenanceability pro-
vides awareness of what goes on in the back-end physical server (i.e., virtual and physical ma-
chines). Provenance data related to a cloud include customer identification information; infor-
mation about the VMs and PMs where data is processed; and intra-cloud communication between 
different PMs within a cloud, transfers of data across VMs and PMs located across different ge-
ographies in a cloud.  
Provenanceability is linked to tracing the origins of security and privacy violations of an enti-
ty [28]. Using provenance data one can check whether a file has been accessed by some mali-
cious party using the same VM; whether a cloud administrator with full access rights tampering 
the file from anywhere inside the cloud; attest the integrity and enforcement of cloud resource 
policies; detect data transfer across geographic boundaries [29]. Provenanceability therefore, re-
lates to the following vulnerabilities: Malicious Insiders, Privileged User Access, Regulatory 
Compliance, Data Location and Insufficient Investigate Support. 
At the same time, the accumulation of provenance data (which potentially relate to sensitive 
information) might constitute a potential privacy violation in the case it is exploited in a mali-
cious manner. Hence the cloud storage provider should ensure appropriate security for prove-
nance itself. 
 
3.3 Traceability 
Traceability refers to the ability to track users’ activity by means of recorded data and is an 
essential property of SaaS applications providing a trace of how user data is generated, used, 
stored and shared. Traceability enables users to trace the physical location of their data and to 
verify that they are processed according to their collection purpose. In addition, it can be helpful 
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in case of accidental deletion of user data. This property is matched with the following cloud 
threats and vulnerabilities: Data Loss, Data Breaches, Malicious Insiders, Regulatory Compliance 
and Data Location. 
A main privacy concern linked to traceability is the privacy ‘right to be forgotten’, i.e., that 
no third parties are able to access personal data after being deleted. In fact several cases have 
been reported with respect to privacy violation due to improper data deletion (documents, photos, 
etc.). At the same time, traceability protects users’ privacy through the ability of tracing data 
among the data repositories and reassuring that the data have been completely deleted or main-
tained invisible and anonymized after their deletion2.  
 
3.4 Intervenability 
Intervenability refers to the fact that, users should be able to have access and process their da-
ta despite the cloud’s service architecture. A cloud vendor may rely on other provider’s subcon-
tractor services in order to offer its services. That should not be an obstacle for users to intervene3 
with their data in case they suspects that their privacy is violated by the subcontractors. In fact 
cloud vendors must be able to provide all the technical, organizational and contractual means for 
accomplishing this functionality for the user including all respective subcontractors that the ven-
dor cooperates and interrelates [20]. The same applies for the situation that a cloud vendor or the 
subcontractors are bankrupted and client’s data are moved to another provider. This concept is 
matched with the cloud vulnerabilities of Insufficient Due Diligence, and Data Location. 
 
                                                
2 In some cases, certain cloud service providers apply retention policies as far as data are concerned. That means that 
for several reasons, that are stated inside the contract between the cloud provider and the client, the data remain at  
rest after the clients deletion request for some time and are strictly accessed form specific personnel and only for 
certain purposes. 
3 Intervention in this context includes access, rectification, erasure, blocking and objection 
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3.5 Accountability 
According to the accountability property, cloud providers should be able to provide at any 
given time information about their data protection policies and procedures or specific cloud inci-
dents related to users’ data, irrespective to the cloud service model used and relates to all cloud 
threats and vulnerabilities. The cloud architecture is a complex type of information system. In 
terms of management and audit controls, this could result in very difficult manageability of the 
protections mechanisms and incidents.  In case of a privacy violation, a cloud provider should be 
able in any given time to provide information about what, when and how an entity acted and 
which procedures were followed to tackle it [20].  
 
3.6 Relation between privacy properties and cloud service models 
As already mentioned, not all cloud service models suffer to the same extent from all threats 
and vulnerabilities. As a result different cloud models should place emphasis on providing appro-
priate measures for addressing different privacy issues in different levels of abstraction. 
Table 2. Matching Privacy Properties with Cloud Threats, Vulnerabilities and Services Models   
 IaaS PaaS SaaS Cloud Threats Cloud Vulnerabilities 
Isolation x x x Abuse of Cloud Services 
Account Hijacking 
Data Breaches 
 
Insecure APIs 
Malicious Insiders 
Shared Technology Issue 
Privileged User Access 
Lack of Data Segregation 
Provenanceability x    Malicious Insiders 
Privileged User Access 
Regulatory Compliance 
Data Location 
Insufficient Investigate 
Support  
Traceability   x Data Loss 
Data Breaches 
 
Malicious Insiders 
Regulatory Compliance 
Data Location 
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Intervenability x x x  Insufficient Due Diligence 
Data Location 
Accountability x x x Abuse of Cloud Services 
Data Breaches 
Data Loss 
Account Hijacking  
Denial of Service 
Insecure APIs 
Malicious Insiders  
Shared Technology Issue  
Insufficient Due Diligence 
Privileged User Access 
Regulatory Compliance 
Data Location 
Lack of Data Segregation 
Insufficient Investigate 
Support 
 
 
Table 2 presents the correspondence between the identified privacy properties and the three 
cloud service models. Using this table, analysts can identify the privacy properties relevant to 
their system, and how these might constraint the design of the information system on a cloud en-
vironment. 
 
4. Implementation Techniques 
Implementation techniques are proactive measures aiming to promote effective privacy pro-
tection, which might be technically based, or in the form of contractual assurances. In this section 
we present a brief overview of standardized privacy solutions and research in progress aiming to 
prevent or detect privacy breaches.  
 
4.1 Boundary protection techniques (Firewalls) 
A firewall is a boundary protection mechanism that enforces access control policies and filter-
ing rules in network environments, controlling the flow of information into or out of an intercon-
nected system.  In the cloud environment, firewalls tackle the problem of resource isolation from 
a networking perspective. Recent editions of firewalls are implementing intrusion detection and 
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prevention inside their core functions, which is in support of privacy preservation [30]. Of special 
interest are virtual firewalls that achieve isolation between virtual machines inside a virtual net-
work through appropriate filtering of network data. Furthermore, they provide important logging 
function thus assisting analysis and detection of malicious traffic that is sent to and from a virtual 
machine through the router.  
 
4.2 Hypervisor Hardening, Language, Sandbox, Virtual machine, OS – Kernel, and Hard-
ware based Isolation  
These techniques also implement access control on computational and storage resources 
providing logical isolation between different entities inside the cloud. Two types of isolation are 
implemented, software and hardware based isolation. The former is achieved by the first five 
techniques which aim to seal all the procedures, operations and data flows through the installa-
tion of multiple isolation layers using different programming techniques. For example, language 
based isolation ensures that programs can only access appropriate memory locations and that con-
trol transfers happen to appropriate program points. Sandbox based isolation creates confined 
execution environments for running untrusted programs on the same machine. OS-Kernel based 
isolation enforces policies that are required for isolation between applications. Virtual machines 
provide virtual isolated platforms for running operating systems. Hypervisor hardening secures 
the hypervisor management console used to configure and control all aspects of virtual machines, 
also monitoring administrators’ operations. On the other hand, hardware based isolation is 
achieved through hardware controls that grant secure direct hardware access to virtual machines 
[31]. 
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4.3 Encryption  
Encryption mechanisms are used in order to ensure the secrecy of important information in-
side the cloud environment (including data kept for monitoring and tracking purposes) and to 
avoid inappropriate information disclosure [24]. Encryption techniques are implemented in vari-
ous areas of the cloud, in order to encrypt data while it is being transmitted, stored or processed 
([29, 32]). Ideally, a cloud customer should encrypt its data before moving it to a public cloud. If 
customers cannot do this themselves, then encryption should be outsourced to a security service 
offered by the cloud provider. 
 
4.4 Privacy Policies and Contracts  
Appropriate privacy policies and contracts can also be used in order to assure client’s interest 
in terms of privacy protection. Machine-readable policies associated to personal information (in-
cluding provenance data), are user preferences or conditions about how that information should 
be treated (for example, that it is only to be used for particular purposes, by certain people or that 
the user must be contacted before it is used).  
Permitting users to state preferences for the management of their personal information and 
take account for this maximizes user control. Contractually fixed agreements (such as Security 
Service Level Agreements (SSLA) sometimes also referred to as Protection Level Agreements 
(PLA)), on the other hand, form the legal obligation of the cloud service provider. They include 
contractually fixed security restrictions, compliance checks, as well as security information and 
event management [33]. Cloud users must be very careful about the terms and conditions of the 
service they are using in order to ensure that their privacy is not violated in case of an incident or 
a situation that needs to be cleared, e.g. data hosting in foreign countries, what happens in case 
the cloud provider is bankrupted etc. [6, 20, 29]. 
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4.5 Forensics  
Cloud forensics is a subset of network forensics. The term was first introduced in [34], to des-
ignate the need for digital investigation in cloud environments. Forensics is meant to preserve the 
privacy of users from being exploited by detecting privacy violation incidents and identify who is 
accountable for them. Forensics is based on the appropriate collection of provenance data by 
cloud service providers. Whilst IaaS customers enjoy relatively unfettered access to the data re-
quired for forensic investigations, SaaS ans PaaS customers may have little or no access to such 
data. Therefore appropriate terms regarding forensic investigations should be included in SLAs 
[17, 28, 29, 35, 36]. On the other hand, the process of extracting data evidences raises privacy 
concerns in itself, making the balance between forensics and privacy a challenging issue [37].  
 
4.6 Identity and Access Management (IAM) 
In this category fall technologies which, combined or individually, protect the client’s privacy 
through a solid framework that prevents unauthorized access to resources. According to [38] ef-
fective management of identities includes the following processes: Identity provision-
ing/deprovisioning; Authentication and federation; Authorization and user profile management; 
and Support for compliance. IAM employs several mechanisms including identity-based cryptog-
raphy, federal identity management and role-based access control which can be accomplished 
with the use of formal internet standards such as SAML, XACML and SPML. Privacy-
preserving/enhancing identity-management aims to maximize the control that individuals have 
over their identity information and to minimize the identity information that individuals have to 
release to the system. Anonymous credential systems and user-centric systems are example pri-
vacy-preserving identity-management systems [21, 39, 40]. 
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4.7 Data tracking 
Data tracking techniques monitor operations on data files at different levels of granularity 
(from the application level to the PM level) as well as file transfers both inter-cloud and intra-
cloud. They capture and log for example, who, what (file operation), where, and at what time a 
file is accessed, or a table in a database were modified. Inquiring these logs allows users to verify 
properties of their data and increase awareness of its lineage, for example, in order to check 
whether their data is deleted or where it is located [29, 39]. Integrity and confidentiality of data 
traces should be ensured in terms of appropriate mechanisms in order to avoid unauthorized ac-
cess (data leakage) or even tampering of log files from privileged users. 
 
4.8 Process identification and validation 
Complementary to the data-centric view described above these techniques monitor the pro-
cesses that generate and modify data, aiming to capture provenance across applications, to ensure 
that the outcomes are reliable or that privacy is not violated by malicious processes [29]. Similar 
to data tracking, process-related data should also be protected in order to prevent data leakage 
and assure that privileged users will not tamper the contents of log files.  
 
4.9 Privacy preserving data mining 
In many situations service providers are using collected data from the users, e.g. data traffic, 
search history, configurations, in order to examine them and make a customer profile for market-
ing purposes. However, in order to protect users’ privacy, such procedures should provide basic 
anonymization, de-personalising information prior to analyzing or transferring it across machines 
[41]. 
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Privacy-preserving data mining techniques may also be used to mine the union of databases 
of different customers. In this case, the only information revealed to either of the database owners 
about the other’s data should be the minimum amount of information that could possibly be pro-
vided by the customer for the service to be operable [42].  
 
4.10 Monitor and Audit  
Auditing is the process of tracing and logging significant events that could take place during a 
system run-time. It can be used for analysis, verification and validation of security measures to 
achieve overall security objectives in a system. Audit events can include, for example, password 
changes, failed logons, or failed accesses related to information systems, administrative privilege 
usage etc. Auditable events may also be dictated by applicable laws, directives, policies, regula-
tions, and standards. Monitor and audit procedures are incorporated into security tools and help 
protecting client’s privacy and provide information as to who is accountable for an event inside 
the cloud environment [43].  
 
4.11 Matching Privacy Properties with Implementation techniques  
The techniques described above fall in the category of privacy-enhancing technologies, aim-
ing to prevent or detect privacy violations. In terms of prevention they aim to secure (IAM, en-
cryption, firewalls, hypervisor hardening, isolation mechanisms) or minimize the amount of per-
sonal data being held or transferred (privacy preserving IAM, privacy preserving data mining). 
Furthermore they can provide individuals with control over their personal information that is be-
ing held in terms of privacy policies and contracts. With respect to detection they focus on the 
collection and analysis of historical data (IAM, data tracking, process identification, forensics, 
monitor and auditing). Sometimes a solution may address some concerns whilst raising new ones. 
 20 
For example, detection solutions require the collection and analysis of additional data which 
might also contain or relate to personal information, which raises concerns with respect to who 
can access this data. Thus, additional prevention solutions should be used in combination. 
In order to make an informed decision regarding which PETs should be used in a specific 
context one needs to understand the relationship between privacy needs and the capabilities of the 
implementation solution. To this end, the matching presented in Table 3, provides an initial step 
on how to bridge the gap between the desired privacy-related cloud properties and the technolo-
gies that might be used to assure these properties. 
 
Table 3. Matching Privacy Properties with Implementation techniques 
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Boundary protection techniques  x    x 
Encryption x x x  x 
Hypervisor Hardening x    x 
Isolation techniques x     
Privacy Policies and Contracts  x x x  
Forensics  x   x 
Identity and Access Management x x   x 
Data Tracking Techniques  x x   
Process identification and valida-
tion 
 x    
Privacy Preserving Data Mining     x 
Auditing     x 
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5. The EU eHealth example 
The aim of this section is to illustrate how analysis of user privacy needs can guide the identi-
fication of an implementation solution, using an eHealth example described in [44]. 
The purpose of the system into consideration is to provide shared access and information 
about patients of a specific region, via a cloud infrastructure, to physicians and patients. The data 
to be moved to the cloud are: 
• Physician’s information (including address and contact details) 
• Patients’ generic health records (not relating to specific illnesses) 
• General health information not related to any specific patient as well as details and loca-
tions of medical centers and pharmacies. 
The cloud solution chosen by the consumer is a public cloud according to the IaaS service 
model where all data would be stored in public servers. The application will be made accessible 
to end users (physicians and patients) according to the SaaS model. The data to be shared and 
especially patients’ health records fall in the category of sensitive information so the cloud pro-
vider should realize the appropriate technical means to assure the privacy of user data. Another 
main user concern was the issue of inter-border data flow. In particular, users wanted assurance 
that all data uploaded should be stored in servers inside the European Union and no data pro-
cessing should be performed outside the European Union.  
Inter-border data flow corresponds to two of the cloud vulnerabilities mentioned in Table 1 
namely, Data Location and Regulatory Compliance. Both these issues can be extremely difficult 
to ascertain due to the dynamic nature of cloud computing. To guarantee that data will remain 
within the EU at all times the cloud provider should be able to derive the history of data objects, 
to assure that is, the privacy property of provenanceability. The use of non-dedicated-servers on 
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the other hand, raises concerns relating to Shared Technology Issues at the IaaS level and of Lack 
of Data Segregation at the SaaS level which in turn relates to the privacy property of isolation.  
As a result the design of the cloud solution should provide appropriate mechanisms in order 
to assure both properties.  
Based on the correspondence between privacy properties and implementation techniques pro-
vided in Table 3, a number of techniques can be applied however, application of each technique 
should be considered in combination with the cloud service layer. For example, since the solution 
combines the IaaS and SaaS models encryption mechanisms in both layers should be considered. 
The above example, though not exhaustive indicates how focusing on user needs can guide the 
definition of an appropriate implementation solution that addresses the associated privacy issues. 
  
Define privacy needs
• Data sensitivity
• Location of data
• Cloud service model
• …
Elicit privacy properties
• Identify potential privacy issues
• Identify relevant  privacy properties
Identify implementation 
solutions
• Identify candidate implementation
techniques matching privacy
properties
• Select optimum combination of
implementation techniques  
Figure 1. Privacy driven definition of implementation solution 
In particular, the proposed way-of-working (shown in Figure 1) consists of the following 
steps: 
1. Define privacy needs of users. To achieve this one should take into consideration among  
others the sensitivity of the data to be stored in the cloud, the privacy regulations that the 
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system should comply to (related also to the data location and cross-border data transfers) 
and the chosen cloud service model. Based on this analysis one can identify the privacy 
concerns of the users (e.g., transborder flaw and unauthorized access to sensitive infor-
mation).  
2. Elicit related privacy properties. In the proposed approach this is achieved by identifying 
the potential threats and vulnerabilities that hinder the satisfaction of the users needs (e.g., 
Shared Technology Issue, Lack of Data Segregation) and using the association Table 2 to 
identify relative properties (e.g. Isolation). 
3. Identify implementation solutions that address each security property. To this one should 
identify the privacy objectives related to each property taking into consideration cloud 
service model as well as the association between privacy properties and implementation 
solutions in Table 3. 
The result of this process might be expressed in terms of a secure Tropos reference model 
(see [3]), as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Security reference model for the EU eHealth example  
 
This model is constructed during the initial stages of the system development and can be used 
later in the development process to identify privacy requirements that must be introduced to the 
system-to-be (by taking into account the privacy needs of the system) and also to identify possi-
ble means (implementation techniques) that contribute towards the satisfaction of the privacy 
requirements that are introduced to the system. 
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6. Discussion 
The various innovations that cloud computing introduced in its operational environment vary 
from the traditional “trusted” environment where traditional information systems rely on. These 
innovations give rise to new privacy concerns that need to be taken into account during the de-
sign and implementation of new information systems or the migration of existing systems on 
cloud environments. The work presented in this paper forms an initial effort towards that direc-
tion. Furthermore, it helps to bridge the gap between design and implementation phases by sug-
gesting a number of privacy-enhancing technologies specific to cloud environments. The identi-
fied privacy properties and associated implementation techniques can add on existing privacy 
requirements engineering approaches in order to better deal with the design of cloud oriented sys-
tems. This forms a future extension of our work, i.e. the transformation of the identified privacy 
properties into technical requirements and the formulation of appropriate design patterns specific 
to the cloud that will satisfy those requirements in different contexts, according to similar work 
on privacy patterns [9, 10, 45]. 
Allied to privacy is the issue of trust. Indeed recent surveys indicate privacy as one of the ma-
jor factors affecting perceived trust on cloud services/providers [18]. The relation between trust 
and privacy is intricate. Privacy protection builds trust between cloud services and users. At the 
same time data privacy requirements depend on the trust in the entities collecting and processing 
it. Moreover, trust relationships can be at the center of certain privacy solutions involving for 
instance some form of key distribution. In many cases users may obtain cloud services (e.g. soft-
ware applications) from a certain provider running on a cloud infrastructure that is provided by 
another provider, who might as well lease processing and storage capacity from other service 
providers. Apart from cloud providers and users, additional intermediary entities may be involved 
in the trust chain such as cloud brokers and cloud auditors, i.e., entities who conduct assessment 
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of cloud services [43, 46]. Understanding the trust relationships between the cloud entities in-
volved is essential in order to establish that a cloud service will deliver the required privacy 
mechanisms needed to assure the privacy requirements of the cloud user. 
The issues and challenges of trust in cloud computing have been widely discussed and a 
number of trust models and trust mechanisms have been proposed including the verification of 
Service Level Agreements (SLAs) or the measurement of Quality of Service (QoS) attributes. 
Each contributes a partial view of cloud trust however they do not illustrate how cloud entities 
work together or identify the chains of trust from cloud users to cloud services.  
Huang and D.M. Nicol [46], suggest a ‘societal’ mechanism for identifying trust relations in 
the cloud. The proposed approach identifies the dependencies between cloud entities and the 
sources of evidence for trusting each entity. The framework aims to provide a systemic view of 
trust analysis; however it does not provide any tools for modeling trust dependencies or reasoning 
about these dependencies. In addition, whilst it acknowledges privacy as a trust parameter it does 
not specifically link nor how privacy concerns may affect this trust.  
Another concern related to the selection of appropriate cloud solution is the selection of the 
service provider. A number of approaches focus on soft issues such as the reputation of a service 
provider, whilst others focus on hard trust factors (mainly security and performance). Most ap-
proaches aim on quantifying these factors and provide an aggregate score relating on how trusted 
a cloud provider is. However their evaluation is based on data on how well a cloud provider op-
erates often provided by the cloud providers themselves and is usually hard to acquire. 
Rather than relying on performance data, trustworthy selection of a cloud provider could be 
based on whether a cloud provider fulfils the customer’s requirements in terms of the provision 
of appropriate mechanisms that achieve these requirements. To this end, the proposed privacy 
properties and implementation techniques could be used in order to elicit the specific privacy re-
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quirements in a given context as well as the appropriate privacy mechanisms. Once these have 
been identified, the selection of an appropriate service provider can be based on the degree of 
satisfaction of these mechanisms by potential cloud providers.  
 
7. Conclusion 
There is increasing awareness that privacy should be integrated into the design of information 
systems delivered in the cloud, as dependence on the cloud provider to process and manage per-
sonal data leads to increased privacy concerns. Multi-tenancy and multi located data storage and 
applications in the cloud make privacy risk even more intense. 
A number of recent surveys focus on the identification of privacy concerns related to different 
cloud service models in terms of potential attacks that exploit the vulnerabilities of cloud tech-
nologies [1, 14, 17, 19, 26, 47]. This paper extends the above by relating cloud threats and vul-
nerabilities to specific cloud quality properties that raise privacy concerns.  
Parallel work in this area has identified technical countermeasures in order to address particu-
lar privacy issues in specific contexts. Examples include the dynamic credentials algorithm for 
mobile cloud computing systems described in [48] or the provenance-aware policy language for 
the cloud presented in [49]. In this paper the focus is in abstract solutions applicable to the cloud 
and their mapping to specific privacy-related properties.  
Further work is required in order to identify and propose an appropriate combination of im-
plementation solutions for the system under development due to the complexity of the cloud ar-
chitecture and the combination of service models and this is the subject matter of our current 
work. 
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